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NEWS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
Part II: International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
by Cecile E.M. Meijer*

Appeals Chamber
In 2001 the Appeals Chamber rendered three appeals
judgements on the merits in ICTY cases: Celebići and Jelisić
(both of which are discussed in Human Rights Brief, Volume
9, Issue 1), and Kupre skić, which is discussed below. Five
ICTY cases on the merits are currently pending on appeal:
Blaskić, Kunarac et al., Kordić & Cerkez, Krstić, and Kvocka et al.,
as well as the Sentencing Judgement in the Celebići case.
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Kupreskić Judgement
On October 23, 2001, the Appeals Chamber rendered its
judgement in Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupre skić, Mirjan Kupre skić,
Vlatko Kupreskić, Drago Josipović, Vladimir Santić (Case No. IT95-16-A). The Appellants were all Bosnian Croats, whom
the Trial Chamber had found guilty of crimes against humanity for their role in the April 1993 attack on the Muslim
population of the Bosnian village of Ahmici. On January 14,
2000, the Trial Chamber had sentenced them to imprisonment for terms ranging from 6 to 25 years. In a landmark
decision, the Appeals Chamber reversed the convictions of
Zoran, Mirjan, and Vlatko Kupreskić, and ordered their
immediate release from the UN Detention Unit in The
Hague. This was the first time in ICTY history that the
Appeals Chamber acquitted defendants on appeal. In contrast, the Chamber affirmed the convictions of Josipović
and Santić, reversed their acquittal on two counts on grounds
of considerations of cumulative convictions, and reduced
their prison sentences.
Zoran and Mirjan Kupreskić had been found guilty by the
Trial Chamber of persecution as a crime against humanity.
In addressing their grounds of appeal, the Appeals Chamber examined challenges to the wording of, and lack of
specificity in, the Amended Indictment; the participation of
both defendants in an attack on one particular house in
Ahmici; the Trial Chamber’s finding that both defendants
provided local knowledge and had their homes used as a base
for the attacking troops; and the Trial Chamber’s conviction
of Zoran and Mirjan Kupreskić for persecution prior to the
Ahmici attack. With respect to the Amended Indictment, the
Trial Chamber concluded that it “failed to plead the material facts of the Prosecution case . . . with the requisite detail”
and did not particularize the charge of persecution as a
crime against humanity. This vagueness resulted in an
infringement on the appellants’ right to prepare their
defense and rendered the trial unfair. By convicting on the
basis of this vague Amended Indictment, the Trial Chamber
had erred in law, and the court allowed this ground of
appeal.
Both defendants also challenged the Trial Chamber’s
assessment of the evidence of their participation in one specific attack, provided by a single witness, Witness H, who was
13 years old at the time of the crimes (18 when testifying
before the court). In particular, the defendants contested Witness H’s identification of them among the attackers on her
father’s house, in which she was present at the time. After
careful consideration of all the defendants’ complaints, the
Appeals Chamber noted a “collection of errors” on the part
of the Trial Chamber and concluded that the lower court’s
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assessment of Witness H’s evidence “diverges so significantly
from that apparent upon review by the Appeals Chamber”
that it “must be rejected as ‘wholly erroneous.’ ” In its view,
the Trial Chamber not only “erred in its overall evaluation
of the evidence as being compelling and credible,” but also
“ ‘in accepting the totality of the evidence as being sufficient
to enter a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”
In its final conclusion, the Appeals Chamber concluded
that there had been a “miscarriage of justice” because the
Trial Chamber had relied upon the evidence of one particular witness, Witness H, without whose testimony the cases
against both defendants “cannot stand.” The Appeals Chamber found it inappropriate, however, given the circumstances
of the case, to remand the case for retrial and consequently
reversed the convictions against Zoran and Mirjan Kupreskić.
Both defendants were ordered released immediately.
Likewise, the conviction of Vlatko Kupreskić for one
count of persecution as a crime against humanity (based on
aiding and abetting) was reversed. The Appeals Chamber reasoned that additional evidence had shown errors of fact
with respect to two factors upon which the Trial Chamber had
based its decision, while “no reasonable tribunal [sic] of
fact could find Vlatko Kupreskić guilty as an aider and abettor of persecution based on the remaining evidence.” This
had resulted in a miscarriage of justice, according to the
Chamber. The Appeals Chamber ordered Vlatko Kupreskić
released immediately.
Although Josipović and Santić were not as successful in
their appeals because the Chamber allowed only some of their
appeal grounds, the Appeals Chamber revised their sentences. It reduced Josipović’s total sentence from 15 to 12
years’ imprisonment, and Santić’s total sentence from 25 to
18 years’ imprisonment, both with credit for time already
served.
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Trial Chamber
In 2001 the ICTY Trial Chambers issued several judgements on the merits and sentencing judgements: Kordić &
Cerkez, Sikirica et al., Krstić, Todorović, Celebići and Kvocka et al.,
as well as numerous orders and decisions. The following
discusses these judgements except the Kvocka et al. judgement,
which will be reviewed in a later issue.
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Kordić & Cerkez Judgement
On February 26, 2001, the Trial Chamber pronounced its
Judgement in Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić & Mario Cerkez (Case
No. IT-95-14/2-T). Kordić and Cerkez, both Bosnian Croats,
had been charged with 44 counts of grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of war,
and crimes against humanity for atrocities in the Lasva Valley in Central Bosnia in 1993. The indictment based Kordić’s
and Cerkez’s individual and superior responsibility on Articles 7(1) and/or 7(3) of the ICTY Statute. After a lengthy
trial, the Trial Chamber found the accused guilty of most
charges and sentenced Kordić to 25 years’ imprisonment and
Cerkez to 15 years.
v
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Kordić was a political leader for the Bosnian Croats in Central Bosnia and exercised authority in the Lasva Valley,
where most crimes were committed. Regarding the persecution count, the Trial Chamber found that as a civilian
leader Kordić was “associated with the military leadership,”
but had no formal part in the chain of command. Based on
the evidence, the court did not accept that Kordić “was in the
very highest echelons of the Bosnian Croat leadership or that
he conceived the campaign of persecution,” nor was he the
“architect of the persecution or the prime mover in it.”
Kordić, however, was a “regional political leader and lent himself enthusiastically to the common design of persecution by
planning, preparing, and ordering those parts of the campaign which fell within his sphere of authority.” With respect
to the charges of unlawful attacks, willful killing, inhuman
treatment, detention, and destruction, the court found that
“[h]is role was as political leader and his responsibility . . .
was to plan, instigate and order the crimes.” Finding that he
was not a commander nor a civilian superior in the legal sense
of having the material ability to prevent or punish the crimes,
the Trial Chamber held Kordić responsible only under Article 7(1) and not under Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute. Out
of 22 counts charged, the Trial Chamber convicted him on
12 counts, including persecution of the Bosnian Muslim
population in Central Bosnia.
In contrast, Cerkez was a military commander in the
Bosnian Croat forces who actively participated in attacks on
certain villages. This made him a co-perpetrator in the persecution and certain other charges. Also, because Cerkez was
a commander, he was held liable under both Article 7(1) and
Article 7(3) of the Statute.
The court followed many precedents set by the ICTY in
earlier cases. For example, in determining whether the
armed conflict at the time and place relevant to the indictment was international in character, the Trial Chamber
applied the two tests enunciated in the Tadić Appeals Judgement: whether another state (Croatia) had directly intervened
in the conflict through its troops, and the alternative test of
“overall control” by another state. The Trial Chamber concluded that both criteria were met and that the conflict had
been internationalized. Similarly, the court largely followed
previous rulings regarding the status of Bosnian Muslims as
protected persons, the scope of Article 3 of the ICTY Statute
(e.g., whether this article applies to internal armed conflicts), the common elements of crimes against humanity
(e.g., widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population), and cumulative convictions.
The Trial Chamber also discussed the important doctrine
of individual criminal responsibility for civilian and military
leaders under Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the ICTY Statute. In
its examination of liability under Article 7(1), the court provided important analysis of different modes of participation,
including planning, instigating, ordering, aiding and abetting,
and participating in a common purpose or design.
In its analysis of the superior-subordinate relationship
forming part of the doctrine of superior responsibility under
Article 7(3), the Chamber quoted extensively from the
Celebići judgements. With respect to civilian leaders it stated
that civilians occupying positions of authority may be held
liable under the principle of superior responsibility “only if
they are found to possess the necessary powers of control over
the actual perpetrators.” This means that “a government
official will only be held liable under the doctrine of comv
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mand responsibility if he was part of a superior-subordinate
relationship, even if that relationship is an indirect one.” The
fact that the government official is an influential person is
insufficient to incur liability, because it is necessary to show
that he has effective control over the perpetrators. Or, in the
words of the Trial Chamber, “[i]n sum, only those superiors,
either de jure or de facto, military or civilian, who are clearly
part of the chain of command, either directly or indirectly,
with the actual power to control or punish the acts of subordinates may incur criminal responsibility” under Article 7(3).
Sikirica et al.
On September 3, 2001, the Trial Chamber rendered its
written Judgement on Defence Motions to Acquit in Prosecutor v. Dusko Sikirica, Damir Dosen, and Dragan Kolundûija
(Case No. IT-95-8-T), following an oral decision of June 21.
In this mid-trial decision, the Trial Chamber acquitted Sikirica of genocide and complicity to commit genocide, and dismissed four specific charges in relation to Dosen. The other
charges against them were retained. Subsequently, all three
defendants, at different times, pleaded guilty to one count
of crimes against humanity for persecution, and each concluded a plea agreement with the Prosecution based on the
understanding that the Prosecution would withdraw all other
charges. The Trial Chamber accepted the Plea Agreements.
On November 13, 2001, the Trial Chamber issued its Sentencing Judgement in the Sikirica et al. case (Case No. IT-958-S), imposing sentences that all ranged within the limits
agreed upon in the plea agreements. Each defendant
received credit for time served, and in accordance with the
respective Plea Agreements, no appeals have been filed. On
December 6, 2001, Kolundûija was released after having
served most of his sentence.
Sikirica was a Commander of Security in the Keraterm
camp in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a camp that was known for
its inhumane conditions, where Dosen and Kolundûija were
shift leaders. In the Second Amended Indictment, the Prosecution had charged Sikirica with genocide and complicity
in genocide, crimes against humanity (persecution, inhumane acts, and murder) and/or violations of the laws or customs of war (outrages upon personal dignity, murder, and
cruel treatment). Dosen and Kolundûija were charged with
crimes against humanity and/or violations of the laws or customs of war for, inter alia, persecution, inhumane acts, and
outrages upon personal dignity.
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Genocide Acquittal
In its Judgement on Defence Motions to Acquit, the Trial
Chamber analyzed the mens rea necessary for genocide,
defined as the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.” Its
analysis focused on two cumulative elements contained in
Article 4(2) of the ICTY Statute: (1) the intent to destroy the
group in whole or in part; and (2) the intent to destroy the
group as such. With respect to the first element, the court
held that there must be “evidence of an intention to destroy
a reasonably substantial number relative to the total population of the group,” or, if that fails, evidence of an intention
“to destroy a significant section of the group, such as its
leadership.” The Trial Chamber concluded that neither
type of intent could be inferred in this case.
Furthermore, the court stated that for genocide the
“evidence must establish that it is the group that has been
continued on next page
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targeted, and not merely specific individuals within that
group. That is the significance of the phrase ‘as such’ in the
chapeau. Whereas it is the individuals that constitute the victims of most crimes, the ultimate victim of genocide is the
group.”
Sentencing Judgement
In its Sentencing Judgement, the Chamber followed the
general sentencing factors set forth in the ICTY Statute and
jurisprudence. First, the gravity of the crime is the primary consideration, together with aggravating circumstances, which
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Second, mitigating
factors must be taken into account, which “need only be
established on the balance of probabilities.” Third, the general practice regarding prison sentences in former Yugoslav
courts must be considered, although this is not binding.
The court then analyzed the gravity of the crime, including aggravating factors, and mitigating circumstances in
relation to each accused. It found with respect to Sikirica that
his position of authority (in relation to the murder of one
individual) and his failure to prevent mistreatment of
detainees by outsiders were aggravating factors. It further held
that his guilty plea, although entered late, should give him
“some credit.” Finally, his expression of remorse was deemed
sincere and also qualified as a mitigating factor. The Chamber sentenced Sikirica to 15 years’ imprisonment (the agreed
range was 10–17 years).
With respect to Dosen and Kolundûija, the Trial Chamber found each one’s position as shift leader with limited
authority an aggravating factor because both had abused their
positions of trust. In contrast to Sikirica, however, neither
Dosen nor Kolundûija had any direct physical involvement
in the criminal conduct. The court considered the following
circumstances, to different degrees, in mitigation of sentences: their guilty pleas, their expressions of remorse, and
the fact that both had often tried to “ameliorate” or “ease”
the hard camp conditions for some detainees. Dosen was sentenced to five years in prison (the limits agreed with the Prosecution were 5–7 years) and Kolundûija to three years (the
limits in the Plea Agreement were 3–5 years).
v
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Krstić Judgement
On August 2, 2001, the Trial Chamber rendered a groundbreaking judgement in Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić (Case No.
IT-98-33-T), finding for the first time an accused guilty of
genocide in Bosnia. General Krstić was Chief of Staff of the
Drina Corps of the Bosnian Serb Army, and subsequently its
commander, when in mid-July 1995 thousands of women,
children, and elderly were forcibly transferred from Potocari
(near Srebrenica) to Bosnian Muslim-held territory, while
thousands of military-aged men were detained and summarily executed. The Trial Chamber found Krstić guilty of
genocide; persecution for murders, cruel and inhumane
treatment, terrorizing the civilian population, forcible transfer and destruction of personal property of Bosnian Muslim
civilians; and murder (under Article 3 of the Statute). The
Trial Chamber sentenced him to 46 years’ imprisonment,
with credit for time served.
The Trial Chamber provided an extensive narrative of the
events leading up to the take-over of the Bosnian town of Srebrenica and its aftermath, which left tens of thousands
uprooted from their homes and some 7,000 dead. In its
legal analysis, the court began by examining whether any vio-

lations of the laws or customs of war and crimes against
humanity had been committed. Having concluded that all
pre-requisites for these crimes had been satisfied, it examined
the elements of crimes with which Krstić had been charged
under Articles 3 and 5 of the ICTY Statute: murder; extermination; mistreatment, including serious bodily or mental
harm, and cruel and inhumane treatment; deportation and
forcible transfer; and persecution. The court gave significant
pronouncements on some of these crimes, for example in
relation to extermination and the distinction between deportation and forcible transfer.
The Trial Chamber then analyzed at length the crime of
genocide. First, the Chamber had to ascertain whether genocide had been perpetrated in Srebrenica in July 1995 against
the Bosnian Muslims. In so doing, the Chamber looked at
what the state of customary international law was at the time
the events took place, particularly in relation to the mens rea,
i.e. the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.”
With respect to the requirement that a group “as such” be
targeted, the Chamber ruled that the Bosnian Muslims constituted the protected group in this case and not the Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica, which it considered a part of
the protected group. In so doing, the court noted that the
Genocide Convention did not contemplate a geographic
location as a distinctive criterion of a protected group. Also,
genocide victims must be targeted “by reason of their membership in a group.” Regarding the “intent to destroy” the
court held that, in this case, “only acts committed with the
goal of destroying all or part of a group” can constitute genocide. Furthermore, it stated that customary international
law at the time the acts were committed limited genocide to
acts that seek to destroy all or part of the group in a physical or biological sense; thus the destruction of property may
be taken into account as proof of the intent to physically
destroy the group when occurring simultaneously with such
destruction.
Another issue before the Trial Chamber was the meaning
and scope of “in part” in the mens rea of “intent to destroy,
in whole or in part, a group, as such.” The Chamber examined various authorities, including the text, drafting history, and early commentaries to the Genocide Convention,
ILC writings, and ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence. This led the
Trial Chamber to opine that “the intent to destroy a group,
even if only in part, means seeking to destroy a distinct part
of the group as opposed to an accumulation of isolated
individuals within it. Although the perpetrators of genocide need not seek to destroy the entire group protected by
the Convention, they must view the part of the group they
wish to destroy as a distinct entity which must be eliminated
as such.” The court concluded that the intent to kill all military-aged Bosnian Muslim men in Srebrenica constituted “an
intent to destroy in part the Bosnian Muslim group within
the meaning of Article 4.” The Trial Chamber thus concluded that it had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt
that genocide had been committed at Srebrenica in July
1995 against the Bosnian Muslims.
The Trial Chamber then turned to the question of General Krstić’s criminal responsibility. It first assessed his culpability for the crimes committed at Potocari (persecution
and inhumane acts as crimes against humanity). The Chamber determined that the political and/or military leadership
had embarked upon a joint criminal enterprise to “ethnically
cleanse Srebrenica,” and that Krstić was a key participant in
continued on next page
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this operation. As the creation of a humanitarian crisis and
the forcible transfer of the population fell within the object
of that enterprise, Krstić, having participated in and/or subscribed to these operations, was held directly responsible for
committing those crimes. The Chamber also held Krstić
responsible for the incidental murders, rapes, beatings, and
abuse inflicted upon the refugees at Potocari, as they were
the natural and foreseeable consequences of the enterprise
of which he was a member.
The Chamber next turned to the issue of whether Krstić
bore any responsibility in relation to the “escalated joint
criminal enterprise” to kill the military-aged men of Srebrenica. While Krstić did not conceive the plan to kill the men
or kill them personally, the Chamber found that he had
participated in the escalated joint criminal enterprise “with
the awareness that such killings would lead to the annihilation of the entire Bosnian Muslim community at Srebrenica.”
Thus, he was found guilty of genocide.
Also, on account of his participation in the escalated
enterprise, the Chamber found Krstić guilty of murder as a
war crime, as well as extermination, persecution, and murder as crimes against humanity. Although the Chamber
found that the elements of command responsibility were also
met, the Chamber declined to enter a conviction on that
basis, finding that his criminal responsibility for the killings
was already “sufficiently expressed” in the finding of guilt
under Article 7(1).
Todorović Sentencing Judgement
On July 31, 2001, the Trial Chamber rendered its Sentencing Judgement in Prosecutor v. Stevan Todorović (Case
No. IT-95-9/1-S), after a guilty plea by the accused on one
count of persecutions on political, racial and religious
grounds as a crime against humanity. The Trial Chamber sentenced Todorović to ten years’ imprisonment with credit for
time served.
Todorović was initially one of the accused in the Simić et
al. case. He was Chief of Police in Bosanski Samac in Bosnia,
where he had superior authority over all police officers; he
was also a member of the Serb Crisis Staff. The second
amended indictment charged Todorović with numerous
counts of grave breaches, violations of the laws or customs
of war, and crimes against humanity on the basis of individual
and/or superior responsibility according to Articles 7(1)
and 7(3) of the ICTY Statute. Specifically, he was accused of
persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds, unlawful deportation or transfer, murder, willful killing, inhumane acts, cruel treatment, willfully causing great suffering, rape, humiliating and degrading treatment, and torture
or inhuman treatment against Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and other non-Serb civilians. At his initial appearance
he pleaded not guilty to all counts.
In late 1999, Todorović challenged the lawfulness of his
arrest and filed a “Notice of Motion for Judicial Assistance.”
The Trial Chamber granted the motion, but the execution
of the order was suspended by the Appeals Chamber pending its final decision. Then in mid-December 2000 (still during the pre-trial phase), the Prosecution and the accused
reached a plea agreement stating that Todorović would
plead guilty to one count of persecution as a crime against
humanity (Count 1 of the indictment), and withdraw all
pending motions regarding his arrest and request for judicial assistance. The Prosecution would withdraw all other
28

charges against Todorović and limit the prison term it would
recommend to the court. After the Trial Chamber had
accepted Todorović’s guilty plea, it entered a finding of
guilty and subsequently ordered the formal separation of the
proceedings against Todorović from those against his coaccused.
The Prosecution and the accused had agreed upon a
prison sentence between 5 and 12 years, although the Trial
Chamber stated clearly that it was not bound by this agreement. In determining the sentence, the Chamber examined the gravity of the crime and aggravating circumstances.
It held that Todorović’s “direct participation in the crimes,
as well as his abuse of his position of authority and of people’s trust in the institution, clearly constitute an aggravating factor.” Similarly, the particular cruelty with which some
of the offenses were committed and their duration constituted an aggravating factor. The Trial Chamber found that
the accused’s guilty plea prior to the start of trial proceedings, his cooperation with the Prosecution, which the Chamber considered “substantial,” and his genuine remorse were
mitigating circumstances that should be taken into account
when determining the sentence. The Chamber concluded
that the accused’s crime of persecution was “particularly
grave” given his superior position and the way in which the
crimes were committed, but also because persecution as a
crime against humanity requires discriminatory intent and
incorporates other crimes. It sentenced Todorović to ten
years’ imprisonment, with credit for time already served.
v

Celebići Sentencing Judgement
On October 9, 2001, the Trial Chamber issued its Sentencing Judgement in the Celebići case (Case No. IT-96-21-TbisR117) against Mucić, Delić, and Landûo, after the Appeals
v
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ICC Ratifications

In Volume 8, Issue 1 of the Human Rights
Brief, we reported on the status of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and U.S.
objections to the court. The ICC will be the
first permanent tribunal to try those accused
of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes.
As of February 5, 2002, 52 countries have
ratified the Rome Statute, the treaty creating
the ICC. The ICC will enter into force once
60 countries have ratified the Rome Statute.
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Chamber had remitted the case earlier in the year for possible adjustment of sentences. The new Trial Chamber
increased Mucić’s sentence from seven to nine years’ imprisonment, decreased Delić’s sentence from 20 years to 18
years, and left unchanged the 15 year sentence imposed on
Landûo.
In its Appeals Judgement on the merits of February 2001,
the Appeals Chamber had allowed the Prosecution’s challenge regarding the seven year sentence imposed on Mucić,
had quashed several convictions on appeal in relation to
Delić, and had dismissed the cumulative convictions under
Article 3 of the ICTY Statute against all three defendants. It
had remitted the case to a newly constituted Trial Chamber
(to be appointed by the ICTY President) to decide on any
adjustments to the original sentences imposed by the Trial
Chamber ruling in first instance in 1998. This “adjustment”
was not meant as a re-hearing.
With respect to Mucić, the Appeals Chamber had found the
prison sentence of seven years inadequate and had indicated
WCAR, continued from page 17

Despite the controversy surrounding the WCAR, affirmative actions can be taken. Fundamental human rights
law, from the 1948 Universal Declaration to the 1966
American Declaration, already contains provisions protecting all of the rights required to redress all forms and
intersections of discrimination. Furthermore, last year,
the CEDAW and the CERD Committees charged with
reviewing compliance with these gender and race discrimination treaties resolved to take into account the
intersectionality of discrimination.
Conclusion
The WCAR focused not only on law, but more importantly, on the barriers to attaining justice created by the multiple manifestations of race, ethnicity, and gender discrimination. Latinas discussed the urgent need to advance
affirmative action and lobbied their governments to take concrete action based on fundamental human rights obligations.
Current proposals and projects, which represent just a sample of the work that lies ahead, include the following: (1)
enforcement of anti-discrimination laws in the areas of
housing, employment, and education for Afro-descendent
and indigenous women who have been relegated to work
as domestic or sexual servants and has been denied access
to fundamental rights; (2) use of numerical quotas to
ensure inclusion of qualified Afro-descendent and indigenous women (and men) in Latin American political systems;
(3) analysis and monitoring of all government, World Bank,
and Inter-American Development Bank programs to ensure
social inclusion and correct discriminatory distribution of
resources; (4) human rights education for Afro-descendent and indigenous women advocates and their allies;
and (5) education of the international human rights community about discrimination experienced by Afro-descendent and indigenous women.
These projects fit the post-WCAR agenda of building
effective anti-discrimination policies based on applicable
human rights law. The glaring disparity between access to
rights and resources encountered by marginalized populations is adequate proof of discrimination under fundamental human rights law. Basic human rights law requires

that “a heavier sentence of a total of around ten years imprisonment” would be more appropriate, leaving aside the possible impact of the reversal of some convictions. The Trial
Chamber took this indication into account and changed
Mucić’s sentence to nine years’ imprisonment. The Trial
Chamber adjusted Delić’s sentence downward from 20 years
to 18 years, based on “the totality of [his] criminality,” after the
Appeals Chamber had quashed his conviction on two counts.
Following its dismissal of the cumulative convictions, the
Appeals Chamber had stated that “the final sentence should
reflect the totality of the culpable conduct and overall culpability of the offender.” Within this context, the Trial
Chamber found that the “totality of . . . criminal conduct”
of all three defendants had not been reduced due to the
quashing of the cumulative convictions, and it allowed no
adjustment on this ground. All three received credit for
time already served. 
* Cecile E.M. Meijer is Legal Coordinator of the War Crimes
Research Office at the Washington College of Law.

the effective remedy of such discrimination through
concrete, affirmative, and systemic measures. The InterAmerican human rights system could provide support for
the necessary affirmative actions to remedy long-standing,
systemic discrimination in Latin America.
As international anti-discrimination law demonstrates,
human rights instruments from the past half-century have
recognized the urgent need to redress all forms of
discrimination. The international human rights community must be mindful that broad interpretation, effective
implementation, and enforcement of anti-discrimination
law is crucial in protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, particularly for marginalized populations. 
* Professor Celina Romany is the Founder-Director and Katherine Culliton is the former Project Coordinator of the Race, Ethnicity and Gender Justice Project in the Americas (REG Justice), which participated in
the United Nations World Conference Against Racism. REG Justice is
a network of Latin American NGOs and scholars working to properly
redress race, ethnic, and gender discrimination in the region.
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